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Abstract
The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a cen-
tral role for economic growth. How does increasing early innovation
appropriability a¤ect basic research, applied research, innovation and
growth? In a common law system an explictly dynamic macroeco-
nomic analysis is appropriate.
This paper analyzes the macroeconomic e¤ects of patent protec-
tion by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into
a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We focus on two
issues: (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual
property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence
shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We show
that the dynamic general equilibrium interations may seriously mis-
lead the empirical assessment of the growth e¤ects of IPR policy:
stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the
short- and possibly medium-run. We also provide a simple "rule of
thumb" indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.
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1 Introduction
Is an increase in the intellectual protection of basic research benecial or
harmful1 for innovation and growth? It is well known that the US economy
in the 1980s witnessed a strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPR).
This implied an increase in the relative bargaining power of the upstream
innovators, and therefore a decrease in the relative bargaining power of the
downstream innovators (i.e. applied researchers or developers). This paper
will show that this has harmful short-run consequences for economic growth,
even though it could be conducive to higher growth in the longer term. In
fact, being basic and applied research endogenous, they respond to the under-
lying relative bargaining power of the upstream innovators in two opposite
ways: R&D reallocates more upstream, thereby slowing down the pace of
innovation for a while. As a consequence, econometric studies may end up
wrongly detecting negative short-term e¤ects of basic research on innova-
tion and growth, with potentially misleading research policy implications.
Therefore, by focussing on the composition e¤ects of patent strength, we can
explain the weak e¤ects of stronger IPR on total R&D and on growth, often
found in the data. This analysis is related to the existing literature on basic
research and economic growth, such as Gersbach, Schneider, and Schneller,
(2010a and b), and Spinesi (2007 and 2012), however here the focus is on the
evolution of the private incentives for basic research by universities or other
institutions.
We will cast our analysis in a dynamic general equilibrium framework,
to better capture all innovation-related features of the economy. This neces-
sarily includes endogenous skill acquisition by individuals who di¤er in their
abilities, as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999). When properly taken into
account, we shall see that the normative assignment of relative bargaining
power of basic versus applied researcher is also related to the returns to edu-
cation. However, in our analysis, tracking the dynamics of the skill premium
and endogenizing education is only instrumental to a better screening of the
short- and long-term e¤ects of basic research incentives on economic growth.
A theory of functional income inequality should instead consider that R&D
employment is only a fraction of the total employment of college workers, as
1Heller and Eisemberg (1998) suggested the existence of a tragedy of the anticommons,
i.e. a proliferation of upstream intellectual property rights which greatly amplify the
transaction cost of downstream research and development, thus hampering downstream
research for biomedical advance.
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in Galor and Moavs (2000) model in which skills are endogenous, and the
demand for schooling is increasing with ability-biased technological change;
and as in Acemoglu (1998 and 2002) and Kiley (1999), which show that
education increases the market for the skill complementary inputs, thereby
driving up the protability of innovations that increase the productivity of
the skilled and therefore the returns to higher education.
In the microstructure of our model, a two-stage cumulative innovation
structure is developed: unlike Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Green and
Scotchmer (1995) we consider free entry by a multitude of rms. Di¤erently
from Bessen and Maskins (2009) analysis of sequential R&D with comple-
mentary innovation, our approach features creative destruction. Unlike Chus
(2010) unambiguous e¤ect of general IPR strengthening on inequality, we will
show that tightening patent protection in basic research may increase or de-
crease wage inequality. Similarly to Furukawa (2007), increasing upstream
patent rights has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on growth, but due to restricted
development rather than reduced experience.
In our framework, basic and applied research technologies are heteroge-
nous and the bargaining power of the upstream innovation changes2, thus
stylizing the evolution of the US jurisprudence after 1980. From that date
on, the US national system of innovation has been re-shaped by a sequence of
important new laws and by a cumulative sequence of sentences that set the
precedents for future modications in the jurisprudence. All these changes
pointed to an increase in the appropriability of innovations at their initial
stages3. Being the US legal system a common-law regime, the jurisprudence
evolved gradually4 in the direction of stricter intellectual protection of re-
2Our framework somewhat complements Eicher and García-Peñalosa, (2008), that en-
visages endogenous IPR based on rm choice, instead of on jurisprudence evolution.
3Including the Stevenson-Wydler act of 1980 and the Bayh-Dole act, of 1980, amended
the patent law, to facilitate the commercialization of inventions obtained thanks to govern-
ment funding, especially by universities. The pro-early innovation cultural change is also
reected in the increasing protection of trade-secrets - starting in the 80s with the Uniform
Trade Secret Act and culminating with the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (Cozzi, 2001)
- as well as in the increasingly positive attitude towards software patents (Hunt, 2001,
Hall, 2009), culminating in the Final Computer Related Examination Guidelines issued
by the USPTO in 1996.
4In our case, it is important to recall Janice Muellers (2004) account of the common law
development of a narrow experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability:
with special reference to the discussion of the change in the doctrine from 1976s Pitcairn
v. United States, through 1984s Federal Circuit decision of Roche Products, Inc. v.Bolar
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search tools5, basic research ideas6, etc. The essence of the common law
is that it is made by judges sitting in courts, by applying their common
sense and knowledge of legal precedent (stare decisis) to the facts before
them. During the early 1980s began a progressive process in which the U.S.
Court decisions changed from the old doctrine limiting the patentability of
early-stage scientic discoveries to the conception that also fundamental basic
scientic ndings (such as genetic engineering procedures or semiconductor
designs) are patentable. This process took a quarter century, culminating in
the 2002 Madey vs. Duke University Federal Circuits decision, which com-
pleted a process of elimination of the "research exemption" to patent claims.
Interestingly, the more recent cases seem to be witnessing an opposite trend,
most notably Merck vs Integra Lifesciences (2005), in which the Supreme
Court decided to re-a¢ rm research exemption in the pharmaceutical sector.
If what deeply characterizes common law (and sharply separates it from
the Continental Europe type legal systems) is an uninterrupted continuity
such that within the stare decisis regime an institutional break point is even
hardly conceivable, we must conclude that the analysis of the e¤ects of the
US patent policy on the economy is forced to include the whole transition
dynamics. The law and economics literature is currently modelling the evo-
lution of the case law in the perspective of analyzing Benjamin Cardozos
and Richard Posners view of common law as e¢ ciency promoting. In fact,
according to this inuential view, unlike civil law, being the common law
decentralized, it follows the aggregate decision making of several heteroge-
nous judges, whose idiosyncratic opinions average one another. Moreover,
the very sequential precedent structure, implies that (Gennaioli and Shleifer,
2007b) one appellate court overrules anothers decision, tending to progres-
sive mitigation and e¢ ciency only if the majority of the judges is unbiased,
depending also on the judges e¤ort cost of changing the legal rule estab-
lished in a precedent. Appellate courts may change a previously established
legal rule also by "distinguishing" the case based on the consideration of
a "previously neglected dimension" (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007a), which
can facilitate convergence towards a more e¢ cient legal rule. We inquire on
whether the increasingly pro-upstream R&D court orientation from 1980 to
2002 has been following an improvement in promoting innovation or if it has
Pharmaceutical Co., all the way to Madey v. Duke University in 2002.
5Another important source of change in sharpening IPRs can be driven by special
interests, as studied by Chu (2008).
6See Gallini (2002), Mueller (2002 and 2004), Scotchmer (2004).
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ended up following the bias of less and less liberal judges. In this paper,
we look for potentially detectable aspects of the time series of several im-
portant variables - skill wage premium, education, innovation, labour force
allocation, and the market value of patents - associated with either long-
term evolution of the legal rules. In doing so, we follow a dynamic general
equilibrium perspective, which allows us to assume that economic agents are
su¢ ciently intelligent to detect what "trend" is occurring, and suitably take
optimizing decisions.
In order to analyze the e¤ects of an expected and progressive change in the
patent protection of basic research, we therefore need to simulate all variables
in their transitional dynamics. We will extract lessons from our numerical
results, useful to detect whether increasing basic research protection common
law doctrine is gradually facilitating the national system of innovation or
evolving for the worse.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and Sec-
tion 3 set the model and Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 5
analyzes a simple special case, useful as a benchmark. Section 6 identies an
important problem with blocking patents. In Section 7 we show the numeri-
cal simulations. Section 8 concludes. The most challenging proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
We assume a large number of dynastic families - normalized to 1 for simplicity
- whose members, born at birth rate b and passing away at rate , live a period
of duration D. The resulting population growth rate7 is g = b    > 0.
This demographic structure implies the following restrictions: b = ge
gD
egD 1 and
 = g
egD 1 .
At time t the total number of individuals is egt. Each individual can
spend her life working as unskilled or studying the rst Tr < D periods and
7Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) have rst developed the overlapping generations
education framework followed here. Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007)
recently studied population and human capital dynamics in continuous time and o¤ steady
states and numerically calibrated in a way methodologically more similar to ours.
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then working as skilled. Each individual cares only about the utility of the
average family member. Hence, despite bounded individual life, the individ-
ual decisions are taken within the household by maximizing the following
intertemporally additive utility functional:
U =
Z 1
0
e tu (t) dt, (1)
where  > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. Per-family member
instantaneous utility u (t) is dened as:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
jdjt (!)
#
d!, (2)
where djt (!) is the individual consumption of a good of quality j = 1; 2; :::
and produced in industry ! at time t, and bought at price pjt (!). Parameter
 > 1 measures the size of the quality upgrades.
Dening per-capita expenditure on consumption goods asE(t) =
R 1
0
hP
j pjt (!) djt (!)
i
d!,
the real interest rate as i(t), and time 0 family wealth as A(0), the intertem-
poral budget constraint is
R1
0
egt 
R t
0 i()dE (t) dt  A(0).
Following standard steps of quality ladders models8, the consumers will
only buy good with the lowest quality adjusted price, and the Euler equation
follows:
_E(t)=E(t) = i(t)  (+ g) = r(t)  , (3)
where r(t)  i(t)   g is the population growth deated instantaneous
market interest rate at time t, and, together with the transversality condition,
determines consumer choice.
Individuals di¤er in their learning ability , which, for each generation, is
uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Hence an individual of ability
 2 [0; 1] will be able to acquire      units of human capital after an
indivisible training period of length Tr. The only cost of education is the
individuals time, which prevents her from earning the unskilled wage wu. In
what follows we choose unskilled labour as our numeraire, and therefore set
wu(t) = 1 at all t  0.
8See Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998).
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Hence an individual born at t with (known) ability (t) 2 [0; 1] and who
decides to educate herself will earn nothing from t to t + Tr, and then earn
a skilled wage ow ((t)    )wH(s) at all dates s 2 [t + Tr; t + D], which
implies that at time t there will exist an ability threshold 0(t) 2 [ ; 1] below
which the individual decides to work as an unskilled. Threshold 0(t) solves
the following equation:
Z t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()dds = (0(t)   )
Z t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds,
obtaining
0(t) =   +
R t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()ddsR t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds
. (4)
Since in a steady state i(t) = + g, the steady state level of 0(t) is
0 =   +
1  e (+g)D
[e (+g)Tr   e (+g)D]wH , (5)
where wH denotes the steady state skill premium.
2.2 Manufacturing
In each nal good industry ! 2 [0; 1] and for each quality level j(!) of
the good, production is carried out according to the following Cobb-Douglas
technology
y (!; t) = X (!; t)M1  (!; t) , for all ! 2 [0; 1], (6)
where  2 (0; 1), y (!; t) is the output ow at time t, X (!; t) andM (!; t)
are the skilled and unskilled labour inputs. In each industry rms minimize
costs by choosing input ratios
X (!)
M (!)
=
1
wH(t)

1   . (7)
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The total per-capita amount L of unskilled labour only works in the
manufacturing sectors. Therefore the aggregate skilled labour demand is
equal to:
X(!; t) =
1
wH(t)


1  

L(t)P (t) (8)
In per-capita terms,
x(!; t)  X(!; t)
P (t)
=
1
wH(t)


1  

L(t)  x(t). (9)
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), skilled labour can also work in the R&D
sectors. Therefore, a higher skill premium wH(t) frees resources for the R&D
sectors.
We assume instantaneous Bertrand competition in all sectors. Since only
the owner of the most recent top quality good patent can produce the top
quality version of its sector good, the equilibrium price will be equal to a
mark-up  > 1 over the unit cost c(wH(t); 1). Moreover, as usual with
Cobb-Douglas preferences, in a symmetric equilibrium per-capita demand is
d(t) = E
c(wH(t);1)
. Therefore is each sector the temporary monopolist who
owns the top quality product patent earns the same prot which, in per-
capita terms, is equal to9:
(t) =
   1

E(t) = (   1)wH(t)x(t)

=
= (   1) 1
1  L(t). (10)
3 R&D and Innovation
The quality level j of each nal product of variety ! 2 [0; 1] can increase
as a result of R&D undertaken by private rms. In order to capture the
9The second equality builds on the Cobb-Douglas property that minimum total cost is 
1 

 (1 )
+


1 
 
ws w
1 
u X
 (!)M1  (!). Hence prot is (   1) times total
cost. Using eq. (8) and simplifying gives the result.
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interaction between basic and applied research, we assume that a basic re-
search idea is a pre-requisite to applied research and applied R&D success
opens the door for a further basic research advance. The rst stage - basic
research - of the product quality jump is the outcome of a Poisson process
with probability intensity 0
P (t)

NB(!;t)
P (t)
 a
per unit of research labour, where
0 > 0 is a basic research productivity parameter, NB(!; t) is the mass of
research labour employed in sector ! at time t, and a > 0 is a congestion
externality parameter.
The second stage - applied research - completes the basic research idea
and generates the new higher quality good according to a Poisson process
with probability intensity 1(t)
P (t)

NA(!;t)
P (t)
 a
per unit of research labour, where
1(t) > 0 is an applied research productivity, viewed by the rms as a con-
stant; NA(!; t) is the mass of research labour employed in sector ! at time t;
and a > 0 is the congestions externality parameter. The presence of popula-
tion size, P (t), in the denominator states that R&D di¢ culty increases with
the total population in the economy10, which delivers endogenous growth
without the strong scale e¤ect11, as suggested by Smulders and Van de
Klundert (1995), Young (1998), Peretto (1998 and 1999), Dinopoulos and
Thompson (1998), Howitt (1999), and recently conrmed empirically by Ha
and Howitt (2006) and Madsen (2008).
Dening nB(!; t)  NB(!;t)P (t) and nA(!; t)  NA(!;t)P (t) , as the skilled labor
employment in each basic and, respectively, applied R&D sector, we can
express the expected innovation rate in a !0 sector undertaking only basic
R&D as 0nB(!0; t)1 a and the expected innovation rate in a !00 sector under-
taking only applied R&D as 1(t)nA(!00; t)1 a. All stochastic processes are
independent both across sectors and across rms. Hence, the existence of a
continuum of sectors implies that the law of large number applies and aggre-
gate variables evolve deterministically. Since all sectors switch from hosting
only basic R&D rms - belonging to subset A0(t)  [0; 1] - to hosting only ap-
plied R&D - belonging to subset A1(t)  [0; 1] - the mass of sectors belonging
to each type will ow deterministically12. Notice that A0(t) [ A1(t) = [0; 1]
and A0(t) \ A1(t) = ;. Moreover, in our model, symmetric equilibria exist,
10Population density favours innovation at the local level (see Hunt, Chatterjee, and
Carlino, 2001): according to this solution to the strong scale e¤ect, the dilution of R&D
is not related to population density, but with the overall size of the economy.
11See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones (2005).
12Provided the initial mass Lebesgue mass of each was positive.
9
allowing us to simplify notation: nB(!; t)  nB(t) and nA(!; t)  nA(t).
Therefore, if m(A0(t)) 2]0; 1[ is the Lebesgue mass of the A0(t) subset -
and hence m(A1(t)) = 1 m(A0(t)) the Lebesgue mass of A1(t) subset - its
evolution would be deterministic and described by the following rst order
di¤erential equation:
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 m(A0(t)))1(t) (nA(t))1 a m(A0(t))0 (nB(t))1 a . (11)
The rst term on the right hand side gives the ow of applied research
results, arising in the fraction of sectors where basic research have been com-
pleted; the second term on the right hand side measures the ow of new basic
research results. We also assume that the aggregate output of basic research
increases the productivity of applied research: 1(t) = 1

1 + 0
hR 1
0
nB(!; t)d!
i1 a'
,
where 1 and ' are positive constants. This formulation introduces the possi-
bility of cross-fertilization of applied research by other sectors basic research
ndings13. In symmetric equilibrium 1(t) = 1
 
1 + 0 [nB(t)]
1 a'.
We assume free entry into basic and applied research. Each inventor, be
she basic or applied, is granted a patent. However, though the rst R&D rm
that invents a new nal product gets the patent anyway, it will infringe the
patent held by the previous basic research inventor. Therefore it will have
to bargain with the basic research patent holder in order to produce the new
version of this good.
Such a framework, incorporating to Green and Scotchmer (1995) research
exemption regime for pure research tools14, captures important aspects of the
real world disputes between inventors whose patent claims allow the blocking
of inventions15. Let (t) 2]0; 1[ denote the share of the nal product (applied)
patent value assigned - at the end of the negotiations taking place at time
t - to the upstream (basic) patent holder16. This share captures time t
13This is complementary to Howitts (1999) assumption of general knowledge, Amaxt ;
being positively a¤ected by the aggregate applied R&D.
14Also see Scotchmer (2004) and Nagaoka and Aoki (2006) for microeconomic analysis
of this important case.
15ODonoghue and Zweimueller (2004) and Chu (2009) are indirectly related, as they
capture the role of patent claims in molding the bargaining between current and future
innovators: their concepts of patentability requirement and leading breadth could be re-
adapted here to accomodate the blocking power of the upstream patent holder.
16Assuming that basic and applied innovators matched and targeted applied innovator-
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court orientation towards intellectual property. Changes in the jurisprudence
towards stronger patent claims and weakening research exemptions would
correspond to increases in (t), whereas a gradually looser upstream patent
holder protection and stronger research exemptions would correspond to a
declining (t). Taken literally, (t) can be obtained as a Nash bargaining
solution between the patent blocker and the applied developer, with the
courts orientation dictating the relative bargaining power. Theoretically, it
is important to notice that both patent holdersoutside options are zero: in
case bargaining breaks down the applied patent holder cannot produce (zero
prot), while the patent blocker cannot complete or nd another completer
because the application is now prior art17.
In what follows, we will consider gradual changes in patent policy in terms
of the sign of _(t). We will assume that the following specication holds:
_(t) = (1   )(   (t)): (12)
Equation (12) is a linear di¤erential equation with constant coe¢ cient,
which describes the speed of change in (t) per unit time. Parameter  < 1
guarantees asymptotic stability and  2]0; 1[ is the steady state. We will
consider the progressive tightening of intellectual property rights in the US
as the result of a sudden change in , which determines a gradual increase in
(t) from its previous lower steady state level to its new level. It is important
to notice that we are in a rational expectation framework: all economic agents
after the regime change can predict the successive increases in (t), and the
transition to a tight IPR regime is known to the agents from the beginning
and all decisions are re-optimized. Hence all our numerical simulations are
immune to Lucascritique. In fact, the steady upstream shift of innovation
incentives is too regular not to be incorporated in peoples expectations,
which leads law scholars to view 1980 as a sort of structural break of equation
(12), and forces us to study the whole transitional dynamics of the models
specic innovations, could re-read this strategic interaction as Aghion and Tiroles (1994a
and b) research unit (RU) and customer (C). Then our case would clearly correspond
to when RUs e¤ort is important ( ~UC > UC), which implies that "the property right is
allocated to RU" (Aghion and Tirole, 1994b, p. 1191). In this light, our (t) generalizes
Aghion and Tiroles (1994a and b) equal split assumption.
17In the realistic case that basic research results have multiple applications, this would
increase the blockers outside option and its equilibrium share of the nal patent value.
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economy. The statutory decisions taken in the early 1980 triggered a gradual
change in the common law18.
4 Equilibrium
Let us dene vB, v0L, and v
1
L as the population-adjusted present expected
value of a basic research patent (vB), of an A0 industry quality leader (v0L ),
and of an A1 industry challenged leader (v1L).
Costless arbitrage between risk free activities and rmsequities imply
that in equilibrium at each instant the following equations shall hold:
wH(t) = 0nB(t)
 avB(t) (13a)
r(t)vB(t) = 1(t)nA(t)
1 a  (t)v0L(t)  vB(t)+ dvB(t)dt (13b)
wH(t) = 1(t)nA(t)
 a (1  (t)) v0L(t) (13c)
r(t)v0L(t) = (t)  0nB(t)1 a
 
v0L(t)  v1L(t)

+
dv0L(t)
dt
(13d)
r(t)v1L(t) = (t)  1(t)nA(t)1 av1L(t) +
dv1L(t)
dt
(13e)
The value of a monopolist in an A0 industry, v0L, has to obey equation
(13d): in fact, the shareholders of the current quality leader compare the risk
free income, rv0L, obtainable from selling their shares and buying risk free
bonds to the expected value of their prots, , net of probable capital loss,
0n
1 a
B (v
0
L   v1L), in case a new basic research result appears in the industry.
As soon as a new basic R&D result appears in the industry, the incumbent
monopolists value falls down to a lower, but still positive, value v1L, which
has to obey eq. (13e): as before, risk free income is equated to expected
prots net of expected capital loss, but now the probability of the basic
research ideas being completed by applied research in the industry, 1n1 aA ,
is the monopolistic prot hazard rate, as the arrival of the new nal product
implies the complete displacement of the current leading edge product.
18According to Fon and Parisi (2006), such a case evolution could also appear in a civil
law system.
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Equation (13a) characterizes free entry into basic R&D (in an A0 indus-
try), equalizing the skilled wage to the probability 0n aB of inventing times
the value vB of the resulting patent.
Equation (13b) equates the risk free income from selling a basic R&D
patent, rvB, to the expected present value of holding it in an A1 industry.
These expected increase in value deriving from someone elses - the nA down-
stream researchers- discovering the industrial application, of value v0L, plus
the gradual appreciation in the case of someone elses R&D success not
arriving, dvB
dt
.
Equation (13c) is the free entry condition for applied researchers that
rationally expect to appropriate only fraction 1   of the value of the nal
good monopolist.
As in the previous section, the industrial dynamics of this economy is
described by equation (11):
dm(A0(t))
dt
= (1 m(A0(t)))1(t) (nA(t))1 a m(A0(t))0 (nB(t))1 a . (14)
These equations must be supplemented with the skilled labour market
equilibrium condition
x(t) +m(A0(t))nB(t) + (1 m(A0(t)))nA(t) = h(t), (15)
where h(t)  H(t)=P (t) is the aggregate population-adjusted human capital.
5 Analysis of a Benchmark Special Case
The analytical results of this section are obtained under the assumption that
 = 0; since all steady state equations are continuous in all variables and
parameters, its comparative statics results continue to hold in a positive
neighborhood where  > 0. Hence while the transversality condition does
not apply here, it holds in a continuum of economies19 associated with  > 0.
Notice that in the steady state the real interest rate is i = r + g, and our
assumption implies i = g > 0. Hence equations where  appears do not
19We have also checked that the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables change
continuously by undertaking numerical simulations.
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formally change20. For simplicity, we will also assume ' = 0: this eliminates
the externality of basic research on applied research.
Notice that eq. (13b), the steady state denition and r = 0 imply:
vB = v
0
L. (16)
From this and from eq.s (13a) and (13c):
nA =

1
0
1  

 1
a
nB. (17)
From equations (13d) and (13e), the steady state denition and r = 0 we
can write:
v0L =
"
1
0
 1
a

1  

 1 a
a
+ 1
#
v1L. (18)
Imposing the steady state into (14) and using (17) yields:
Lemma 1. The steady state equilibrium fraction of industries where basic
R&D is active is
m(A0) =
1
1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
: (19)
Lemma 1 indicates is that the higher the di¢ culty of basic research (ap-
plied research), i.e. the lower 0 (the lower 1) the higher the fraction of
sectors where basic (applied) R&D is needed.
This has implications for R&D enhancing regulation:
Proposition 1. The growth maximizing upstream inventor share, , of
the nal good patent value is equal to:
20More generally, even assuming g = 0, and therefore  = 0 would not imply
complications, as straightforward application of De LHospitals theorem would imply
lim!00 =  + D(D Tr)wH .
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 =
1
0 + 1
=
1
0
1
+ 1
: (20)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that the innovators should be rewarded proportion-
ally more in the stages of R&D where innovation is harder to achieve. Plug-
ging  into eq. (17) implies that at the growth-maximizing policy nA =
nB. Hence the innovation-maximizing share is higher in the (sub-)industries
where (equilibrium) innovation is slower - expected times 1
0n
1 a
B
> 1
1n
1 a
A
imply  > 0:5 and vice-versa.
It is important to notice that here  is common across industries without
the risk of a "one-size-ts-all" loss (Chu, 2011) only because all industries are
symmetric. However, with heterogenous industries, it would be interesting
to generalize this result.
5.1 An Empirical "Rule of Thumb"
The special case we have just analyzed allows us to gain insight on evidence.
In particular, from the knowledge of the basic to applied research ratio, BAR,
we can easily obtain approximations for the actual values of . In fact, eq.s
(17) and (19) yield:
BAR =
nBm(A0)
nA [1 m(A0)] =

1
0
1  

 1
a

0
1
 1
a


1  
  1 a
a
=

1   ,
which implies
 =
BAR
1 +BAR
. (Beta)
Given its extremely simple formulation, we can easily provide some of its
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values in the reported Table 1:
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Therefore, according to NSF data21 of Table 1, in 1980 our calibrated22 
would be equal to 38.94%, while in 2002 would have climbed up to its highest
ever level of 50.18%. This value, taken on by  right in the year of theMadey
vs. Duke University Federal Circuits decision, exceeds 50% and is therefore
clearly suboptimal, based on any positive real interest rates. After that, it
has declined, including becoming 45.85% in the year of the more liberalMerck
vs Integra Lifesciences ( 2005) ruling. Of course, these calibrated values are
to be taken as a "rule of thumb" indicator of the bargaining power of the
upstream innovator: o¤-steady state and with changing interest rates they
ought to be adjusted. Eq. (Beta)s shortcut may o¤er a microfounded and
yet easy-to-compute approximation to practitioners and policy-makers only
to stimulate further investigation.
6 Blocking Patents
The present setup with basic and applied R&D is suitable to analyze a cru-
cial issue: the patenting of basic research may hinder applied innovations
because even basic concepts are patented which potentially precludes new
innovations. Clearly, the incumbent monopolist in the corresponding nal
good sector is the natural suspect of such anti-innovative behavior. In fact,
by appropriating the patent on a basic research result and stopping R&D it
would eliminate expected obsolescence on its product, causing its value to
jump up to 
r
. In the steady state, the incumbent monopolist will buy the
patent in order to block innovation in that sector if its willingness to pay for
the research tool is higher than the outsidersreservation price, that is if and
only if:
vB  
r
  v1L. (21)
Eq. (21) is equivalent to rv1L      rvB. This and eq. (13e) implies that
 1(t)nA(t)1 av1L(t)   rvB.
21Based on National Science Foundation, Table A-22, "Total (company, federal, and
other) funds for basic research, applied research, and development, in current and constant
dollars: 1953-94."
22See Data for Equation (Beta) in the Appendix.
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Using eq. (13b), the above inequality becomes equivalent to:
vB + v
1
L  v0L. (22)
Quite interestingly, for the benchmark special case of the previous sec-
tion, due to eq. (16), the inequality (22) is certainly satised with strict
inequality. While the benchmark special case is only valid as a mathematical
approximation of the steady state equilibrium equations, by continuity the
following holds:
Lemma 2. In an open right neighborhood of r = 0, the steady state
equilibrium implies an attempt of incumbents to block innovation.
This points to a serious problem in the patenting of basic (or applied)
research, which lies in the fact that further innovation may be hindered
because even basic concepts are patented which potentially precludes new
innovations in that eld. This is a danger, which may become true if the
courts are not ready to detect such a practice23. In a well functional judicial
system, according to Maurer and Scotchmer (2004a, p.90), courts "usually
approve arrangements that remove blocking patents so that rms can bring
technologies to market." The typical arrangement is compulsory licensing of
the patented innovative tool. However, given the incentives to block if eco-
nomically powerful incumbent patent holders highlighted in this paper, we
conclude that in the presence of patentable basic research results the courts
crucial role in protecting innovative activity may become more complex.
7 Insights from Numerical Simulations
In this section we will show that when the bargaining power of the basic
researcher, i.e. , increases, it always looks bad at rst. Even if it is good
for long-run growth, in the short- or even medium-run it presents itself as
harmful to growth. In order to show the mechanism to the reader we report
two representative trajectories obtained for the endogenous variables follow-
ing the announcement of a regime change in the law of motion of . This
corresponds to a sudden change in the steady state value of eq. (12) that
23This is an old problem in the history of patents. As reported by Scotchmer (2004, p.
14), "James Watt (d. 1819) used his patents to block high-pressure improvements... Watts
refusal to license competitors froze steam-engine technology for two decades." Fortunately,
patent legal life was not as long as assumed in our model.
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gradually drives the system towards the new steady state. We ran several
discrete approximations of the di¤erential equations (30), (33), (12), (36),
(13b), (13d), (13e), (42),(43), (40), (41), (14), and cross-equations restric-
tions (13a), (13c), (9), (10), (15), and (37), obtaining remarkably robust
results24.
We set the intra-sectorial congestion parameter a = 0:3, consistently with
Jones and Williams(1998) and (2000) calibrations. We set the mark-up 
to 1:68, consistently with what estimated by Roeger (1995) and Martins
et al. (1996). Parameter  = 0:1 - the share of high skilled workers25 in
manufacturing production, is consistent with Berman, Bound, and Griliches,
(1994). We set benchmark values of our new parameter at 0 = 1 = 1,
' = 0:01, but results are robust to huge variations of them. Parameters
D = 40, n = 0:01, Tr = 4,   = 0:75 follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999). For the real rate of return on consumer assets, we adopt the usual
r = 0:05, common in the literature. As for the common law adjustment
parameter, we set  = 0:9.
We assume that the economy begins with a steady state associated with
a given value of . Then  changes and the common law share of the basic
research inventor starts to head to its new steady state value.
In order to make di¤erent simulations comparable, we plot the trajectories
of the deviations of the value of each variable from its initial steady state
value, divided by its initial steady state value.
Figure 1 assumes that, after a long term (40 periods) initial value of
 = 0:35, it suddenly changes to  = 0:5. As a consequence of Proposition
1, such a change will be benecial for long term growth.
24We have also simulated how the dynamic behavior changes if  immediately jumps
to the new steady state level, either expected or unexpected. The basic message of this
section is robust to these variants.
25We here restrict to the share of technician workers in manufacturing in the late Eight-
ies, as indicated by Berman, Bound, and Griliches, (1994). We are ignoring other white
collars, though our simulations are quite robust to alternative specications.
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Figure 1
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In fact, such a change is clearly growth improving from a steady state per-
spective: in the long run the new steady state is characterized by a higher rate
of aggregate growth, a higher skill premium, a higher fraction of population
choosing to educate themselves ("college students") and a higher aggregate
human capital. A higher value of  means a higher fraction of the nal inven-
tion appropriated by the basic researcher who invented its basic research pre-
requisite and a lower value of the nal product appropriated by the applied
researcher who invented its commerciable version. Therefore basic research
is becoming more protable (higher "Basic Patent Value", vB) and applied
research less protable. Consequently basic research employment increases -
both at the aggregate ("Basic Research") and at the industry, ("Nb") level -
and applied research employment decreases both at the aggregate ("Applied
R&D") and at the industry, ("Na") level. A consequence of this is that in
the long run the stock market value (v1L) of an A1 monopolist increases - as it
faces less obsolescence - while the long run stock market value (v0L) of an A0
monopolist decreases, as it faces more obsolescence. Since the positive incen-
tives to basic R&D outweigh the negative incentives to applied R&D, R&D
as a whole becomes more protable and more skilled labour is demanded.
Therefore the skill wage, wH , increases, thereby inducing a larger fraction of
the population to enrol at university. This will gradually increase the supply
of human capital and decrease the supply of unskilled labour.
In the transitional dynamics, it is important to notice that as the change
in the long-term court orientation  is forecast by the private actors, all the
stock variables - (t), h(t), L(t), and m(A0(t)) - are predetermined, and for
example by eq. (10), (t) is constant. Hence only jump variables such a
prices, wages, and employment change. Being (t) monotonically increasing,
the relative incentives of basic versus applied research are gradually changed
in favor of basic and to the detriment of applied research. However, the dy-
namics of (t) interacts with the intrinsically dynamic nature of the R&D
process, in a way that is not captured by the mere comparative statics of
steady state analysis: in fact, the expectation of higher future values of (t)
certainly favours current basic research - the completion of which will take
place in the future - without harming current applied R&D with the same in-
tensity. In a discrete time approximation of our continuous time framework,
let us imagine that basic and applied research complete - with an endoge-
nous probability - in each period: the announcement of a higher  next
period will not penalize current applied R&D, while instead it will encourage
current basic research - which is promised a higher share of the future discov-
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ery. In our continuous time framework the same e¤ect is at work:

(t) > 0
favours the expectedly late fruits of basic research more than it reduces the
expectedly earlier gains of applied research. As a consequence, aggregate
R&D is favoured, and the increase in the demand for nB(t) is matched by
a lower decrease in the demand for nA(t), which implies that the di¤erence
m(A0(t))nB(t)   [1 m(A0(t))]nA(t) increases and must be matched by a
decrease in x(t). The increase in the net demand for R&D labour can be
satised only by a decrease in the manufacturing skilled-labour employment.
This temporary excess demand for skilled labour is the reason for the imme-
diate increase in the skill premium. As time passes, the increase in w(t) will
encourage marginally less able students to enroll to college, thereby leading
to a future increase in the the aggregate supply of human capital and to a
partially o¤setting e¤ect on w(t). However, as long as (t) keeps increasing
the demand for R&D labour continues to grow, though the decline in

(t)
will eventually correct the previously mentioned intertemporal asymmetry
that favoured basic research more than it disincentived applied R&D.
In the generality of simulations we have undertaken, the aggregate inno-
vation rate decreases in an initial period following the policy switch, whose
length depends on the assigned parameters: the economic reason is that R&D
is shifting upstream towards basic research, thereby reducing applied R&D;
this slows down the completion of existing basic research projects, which has
a negative e¤ect on innovation. However, in the case of Figure 1, in the
longer run, the increase in the ow of basic research results will more than
compensate a thinner applied R&D e¤ort.
Our stylized representation suggests that policy makers should not lose
their optimism about innovation enhancing policies based on shorter term
R&D reallocation e¤ects coupled with improvements in the population edu-
cational choices.
The transitional dynamics plotted in the next Figure 2 is based on the
assumption that the initial value of  was 0:55 and it suddenly changes to
0:65. Such a change will be detrimental to long term growth, because the
basic research patent owner gets entitled to too large a share of the nal
invention value. This discourages applied R&D too much, which more than
o¤sets the increase in basic research. Therefore the demand for skilled labour
will fall and so will the skill premium and education.
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Figure 2
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We remark that the short term reactions of the skill premium and of
manufacturing production could inspire wrong interpretations of the true
long term e¤ect of normative changes. In fact, as in the previous discussion,
upon impact all stock variables are given, and mainly short term announce-
ment e¤ects prevail. Most notably, the expected gradual increase in (t)
fails to penalize current applied R&D in the order of magnitude as it favours
current basic research: basic R&D will be entitled to a larger share of the
results of future applied R&D, not those of current applied R&D. Such tem-
porary win-win situation boosts aggregate R&D labour and therefore raises
the skill premium. However, as

(t) sets in, the temporary relief for applied
R&D disappears, and its smaller share of the nal product patent penalizes
it so much that the ensuing drop in R&D employment outweighs the increase
in basic research employment - the whole e¤ect being corroborated by the
gradual increase in 1 m(A0(t)) - dragging the skill premium below the ini-
tial steady state level and therefore leading towards the new steady state,
characterized by less R&D employment and less innovation.
Interestingly,a gradual increase in (t) always leads to an immediate in-
crease in w(t): hence future strengthening basic innovation always increases
the skill premium. Conversely, a gradual decrease in (t) always leads to an
immediate decrease in w(t). However, the long-term impact of these changes
in (t) will depend on whether or not the change is growth enhancing. When
it is growth enhancing w(t) will eventually reach a higher steady state level,
whereas the opposite holds when the long-term court orientation is detrimen-
tal to growth.
The following matrix summarizes the e¤ects of a gradual change in (t)
- i.e. of

(t) - on w(t):
Short-Run Long-Run
Growth Enhancing

 > 0 Higher w Higher w
Growth Harming

 > 0 Higher w Lower w
Growth Enhancing

 < 0 Lower w Higher w
Growth Harming

 < 0 Lower w Lower w
As a result, our simulations warn policy against relying on empirical eval-
uations of IPR changes based on relatively short term e¤ects. The short term
e¤ects of a harmful tightening, respectively relaxing, of the upstream IPR
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look misleadingly similar to those of a benecial bargaining power transfer
towards, respectively from, the basic researcher institutions.
The gures shown in this section are considerably robust and representa-
tive of the pro-upstream IPR changes mentioned so far: changing parameters
we have observed very similar patterns of short-run and long-run dynamics26.
8 Conclusions
The possibility that innovators may use their patents to block future innova-
tors, and/or prevent them from commercialising their products, is a reason
for concern not only among academics. The adoption by the US patent law of
a statutory research exemption has been proposed as a denitive solution to
this problem. But, by postponing bargaining between innovators it may put
the downstream inventor at disadvantage: when is this disadvantage socially
benecial? Can we detect this from the data? This paper has tried to answer
these important questions from a dynamic macroeconomic perspective.
Since the common law system implies gradual transition to new IPR
regimes, we have studied the whole transitional dynamics. The most impor-
tant conclusion is that the transition to a stricter regime does not appear to
be monotonic, which shows how assessments based on short term data could
be misleading for policy makers. For example, increases in IPR may result
in a temporary reduction in economic growth, even if they can be benecial
for long-run growth.
We have also derived an easy to compute approximation of the bargaining
power of the upstream researchers, o¤ering an empirical "rule of thumb" that
suggests that the year of the celebrated Madey vs. Duke University Federal
Circuits decision, i.e. 2005, marked the apex of the power of basic innovation
patent holders, likely quite harmful for growth.
Throughout this paper, we have maintained a closed economy frame-
work. It would be very interesting to extend our model to an open economy,
whereby potentially o¤setting e¤ects may come into play, and contribute to
design a more realistic picture, perhaps rendering even more complicated for
policy makers to e¤ectively gauge growth-maximizing research policy in a
dynamic macroeconomy.
26The les used to generate them are available to the interested readers.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From eq. (35) and (5) follows that the steady
state level of human capital per-capita is an increasing function of the skilled
premium wH , which we can write as h(wH).
Plugging eq. (17) into the skilled labour market clearing condition (15)
yields:
"
m(A0) + (1 m(A0))

1
0
1  

 1
a
#
nB = h(wH)  x(wH)  	(wH) (23)
with 	0(wH) > 0. Inserting eq. (19) into (23) we obtain:
nB


1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
 = h(wH)  x(wH)  	(wH) (24)
Plugging eq. (18) into eq. (13a) and (13e) we obtain:
wH = 0n
 a
B v
0
L = 0n
 a
B 
"
1
0
 1
a

1  

 1 a
a
+ 1
#
v1L (25a)
 = 1n
1 a
A v
1
L = 1

1
0
1  

 1 a
a
n1 aB v
1
L (25b)
From the denition of prots and the steady state mass of unskilled
labour, we know that  = (wH), with 0(wH) < 0. Dividing the last two
equations side by side implies:
nB
1


1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
 = (wH)
wH
. (26)
Plugging (26) into (24) gives:
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1 = 	(wH)
wH
(wH)
 (wH) (27)
where 0(wH) > 0. Therefore there exists a unique steady state level of
the skill premium obtained as the solution to eq. (27). It is important to
notice that, in this example, the steady state skill premium is independent
of .
The steady state innovation rate can be rewritten, after using (26), as:
0n
1 a
B m(A0) =
h
(wH)
wH
i1 a
1 a
1 +

0
1
 1
a


1 
 1 a
a
a = (28)
=
h
(wH)
wH
i1 a

1
0
 1
a

1

 1 a
a
+

1
1
 1
a

1
1 
 1 a
a
a (29)
The numerator does not change with  as previously proved. The innova-
tion rate is maximized when the denominator is minimized. Hence we need
to nd a value of  such that

1
0
 1
a

1

 1 a
a
+

1
1
 1
a

1
1 
 1 a
a
is minimized,
which implies expression (20).QED.
9.1 Labour Supply and Education Dynamics
9.1.1 Unskilled Labor Supply
As previously shown, individuals born at t with ability (t) 2 [0; 0(t)] op-
timally choose not to educate themselves, thereby immediately joining the
unskilled labour force. Hence a fraction 0(t) of cohort t remains unskilled
their whole life. Summing up over all the older unskilled who are still alive
- hence born in the time interval [t   D; t] - we obtain the total stock of
unskilled labour as of time t:
L(t) =
Z t
t D
bN(s)0(s)ds = b
Z t
t D
egs0(s)ds
where b is the birth rate, N(s) is the population at time s.
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To stationarize variables, we divide by current (time t) population egs,
obtaining:
l(t)  L(t)
N(t)
= b
Z t
t D
eg(s t)0(s)ds.
Its steady state level is:
l = b
1  eg( D)
g
0 = 0.
The change in the stock of the population-adjusted stock of unskilled
labour is obtained by derivating l(t) with respect to time:
_l(t) = b0(t)  be gD0(t D)  gl(t) (30)
As in Boucekkine et al. (2002) and Boucekkine et al. (2007) we obtain a
crucial role for delayed di¤erential equations.
9.1.2 College Population
The individuals born in t with ability (t) 2 [0(t); 1] optimally choose to
educate themselves, thereby becoming college students for a training period
of duration Tr. Hence summing up over all the previous cohorts who are still
in college - hence born in the time interval [t   Tr; t] - we obtain the total
stock of college population as of time t:
eC(t) = b Z t
t Tr
N(s)(1  0(s))ds = b
Z t
t Tr
egs(1  0(s))ds.
In per-capita terms:
ec(t)  eC(t)
N(t)
= b
Z t
t Tr
N(s)
N(t)
(1  0(s))ds = b
Z t
t Tr
eg(s t)(1  0(s))ds. (31)
In a steady state:
ec = b1  eg( Tr)
g
(1  0). (32)
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Taking the derivative of eq. (31) with respect to time we obtain:
:ec(t) = b (1  0(t))  be gTr (1  0(t D))  gec(t). (33)
9.1.3 Human Capital
The stock of skilled workers will coincide with those students who have com-
pleted their education and are still alive, born in [t D; t  Tr]:
eH(t) = b Z t Tr
t D
N(s)(1  0(s))ds = bN(t)
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s))ds (3)
The total workforce (including students) in equilibrium equals total pop-
ulation, hence:
L(t) + eH(t) + C(t) = egt.
Due to heterogeneous learning abilities, in order to obtain the aggregate
skilled labour supply, we need to multiply each skilled worker by the average
amount of human capital that she can supply, given by the average skill of
her cohort net of dispersion parameter  :
Z 1
0(t)
(    ) 1
1  0(t)d =
1 + 0(t)  2 
2
.
Therefore the aggregate amount of skilled labour in e¢ ciency units (skilled
labor supply) is:
H(t) = bN(t)
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s)) (1 + 0(s)  2 )
2
ds
Dividing by time t population, we can express per-capita human capital
as:
h(t)  H(t)
N(t)
=
b
2
Z t Tr
t D
eg(s t)(1  0(s)) (1 + 0(s)  2 ) ds. (34)
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The steady state value is:
h = b

eg( Tr)   eg( D) (1  0) (1 + 0   2 )
2g
(35)
The dynamics of human capital can be studied by derivating this expres-
sion with respect to time:
:
h(t) =  gh(t) + b
2
e gTr(1  0(t  Tr)) (1 + 0(t  Tr)  2 )  (36)
+
b
2
e gD(1  0(t D)) (1 + 0(t D)  2 ) .
9.2 Transitional Properties of Educational Choice
The study of the transition dynamics of this model is complicated by the
skilled/unskilled labour dynamics and by the endogenous education choice
under perfect foresight. Key to the solution is the transformation of the
integral equation for the ability threshold level for education into a set of
di¤erential equations.
Dening the present value of the unskilled wage incomes as WU(t) =R t+D
t
e 
R s
t i()dds and the present value of the skilled wage income asWS(t) =R t+D
t+Tr
e 
R s
t i()dwH(s)ds, we know from (4) that
0(t) =   +
WU(t)
WS(t)
. (37)
Dening
R1(t) = e
  R t+Dt i()d , and (38)
R2(t) = e
  R t+Trt i()d (39)
we can write:
_WU(t) = R1(t)  1 + i(t)WU(t) (40)
_WS(t) = R1(t)wH(t+D) R2(t)wH(t+ Tr) + i(t)WS(t). (41)
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Di¤erentiating eq.s (38)-(39) with respect to time we obtain:
_R1(t) = R1(t)(i(t)  i(t+D)), and (42)
_R2(t) = R2(t)(i(t)  i(t+ Tr)). (43)
These equations allow us to cast our model in a framework that can be
studied in terms of delayed di¤erential equations.
9.3 Expenditure and Manufacturing Dynamics
From eq.s (10) follows:
   1

E(t) = (   1) 1
1  l(t). (44)
Log-di¤erentiating with respect to time, using Euler equation (3) and the
unskilled law of motion (30) yield:
i(t)  (+ g) =
_E(t)
E(t)
=
_l(t)
l(t)
=
b0(t)  be gD0(t D)
l(t)
  g (45)
that - since r(t) = i(t)  g - can be rewritten as
r(t)   = b0(t)  be
 gD0(t D)
l(t)
  g, (46)
In the steady state: r(t) = .
References
[1] Acemoglu D. (1998). "Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills?
Directed Technical Change and Wage Inequality," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 113, 4, pp. 1055-8.
[2] Acemoglu D. (2002), "Directed Technical Change", The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 781-809.
31
[3] Aghion, P. and J. Tirole, (1994a). "Opening the Black Box of Innova-
tion," European Economic Review, vol. 38(3-4), pp. 701-710.
[4] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1992), A Model of Growth through Creative
Destruction, Econometrica 60 (2), p. 323-351.
[5] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1996), "Research and Development in the
Growth Process", Journal of Economic Growth, vol.1, p. 13-25.
[6] Aoki, R. and Nagaoka, S. (2007), "Economic Analysis of Patent Law Ex-
emption for Research on a Patented Innovation", Institute of Innovation
Research, Hitotsubashi University, working paper.
[7] Berman, E., J. Bound, and Z. Griliches, (1994), "Changes in the Demand
for Skilled Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from theAnnual
Survey of Manufacturers", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
109, No. 2, pp. 367-397.
[8] Bessen, J. and E. Maskin, (2009), "Sequential innovation, patents, and
imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 40(4), pages 611-635.
[9] Boucekkine, R., de la Croix, D., Licandro, O. (2002), "Vintage Human
Capital, Demographic Trends, and Endogenous Growth ", Journal of
Economic Theory, v. 104, iss. 2, pp. 340-375.
[10] Boucekkine, R., de la Croix, D. and Peeters, D. ; (2007) "Early Liter-
acy Achievements, Population Density, and the Transition to Modern
Growth", Journal of the European Economic Association, v. 5, iss. 1,
pp. 183-226.
[11] Carlino, Chatterjee, and Hunt, R. M., (2001), "Knowledge Spillovers
and the New Economy of Cities", FED of Philadelphia, w.p. 01-14.
[12] Chu, A., (2008)."Special Interest Politics and Intellectual Property
Rights: An Economic Analysis Of Strengthening Patent Protection In
The Pharmaceutical Industry," Economics and Politics, vol. 20(2), pp.
185-215.
[13] Chu, A., (2009)."E¤ects of blocking patents on R&D: a quantitative
DGE analysis," Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 14(1), pp. 55-78.
32
[14] Chu, A., (2010). "E¤ects of Patent Policy on Income and Consumption
Inequality in a R&D Growth Model," Southern Economic Journal, vol.
77(2), pp. 336-350.
[15] Chu, A., (2010), "The welfare cost of one-size-ts-all patent protection,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 35(6), pp. 876-890.
[16] Cozzi, G., (2001), "Inventing or Spying? Implications for Growth";
Journal of Economic Growth, v. 6, iss. 1, pp. 55-77.
[17] Cozzi, G. and G. Impullitti, (2010), "Government Spending Composi-
tion, Technical Change, and Wage Inequality", Journal of the European
Economic Association, Journal of European Economic Association, vol.
8, (December) , pp. 1325-1358.
[18] Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P.S., (1998), Schumpeterian Growth
Without Scale E¤ects, Journal of Economic Growth, 3, pp. 313-335.
[19] Dinopoulos, E. and Segerstom, P.S., (1999), "A Schumpeterian Model
of Protection and Relative Wages", American Economic Review, pp.
450-472.
[20] Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P. S., (1999), Scale E¤ects in Neo-
Schumpeterian Models of Economic Growth, Journal of Evolutionary
Economics, 9(2), pp. 157-186.
[21] Eicher, T. and C. García-Peñalosa, (2008). "Endogenous strength of
intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and
growth," European Economic Review, vol. 52(2), pp. 237-258.
[22] Fon, V. and F. Parisi, (2006). "Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems:
A dynamic analysis", International Review of Law and Economics 26,
519535.
[23] Furukawa, Y., (2007)."The protection of intellectual property rights and
endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?," Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, vol. 31(11), pp. 3644-3670.
[24] Gallini, N., (2002), "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent
U.S. Patent Reform", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, pp. 131-154.
33
[25] Galor, O. and O. Moav, (2000), "Ability-Biased Technological Transi-
tion, Wage Inequality, And Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 115(2), pp. 469-497.
[26] Gennaioli, N. and A. Shleifer, (2007a). "The Evolution of Common
Law," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, pp. 43-68.
[27] Gennaioli, N. and A. Shleifer, (2007b). "Overruling and the Instability
of Law," Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 35(2), p. 309-328.
[28] Gersbach, H., M. Schneider, and O. Schneller, (2010a), "Optimal Mix
of Applied and Basic Research, Distance to Frontier, and Openness,"
CEPR Discussion Papers 7795, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[29] Gersbach, H., M. Schneider, and O. Schneller, (2010b), "Basic Research,
Openness, and Convergence," CER-ETH Economics working paper se-
ries 10/139, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at
ETH Zurich
[30] Gould, E. D., Moav, O., and B. A. Weinberg, (2001), " Precautionary
Demand for Education, Inequality, and Technological Progress," Journal
of Economic Growth, vol. 6(4), pp. 285-315.
[31] Green, J. and Scotchmer, S. (1995)."On the Division of Prot in Se-
quential Innovations", The Rand Journal of Economics 26, pp. 20-33.
[32] Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1991), Quality Ladders in the The-
ory of Growth, Review of Economic Studies 58, pp. 43-61.
[33] Grossman, G.M. and Shapiro, C. (1987), Dynamic R&D Competition,
The Economic Journal 97, pp. 372-387.
[34] Ha, J. and Howitt, P. (2007), "Accounting for Trends in Productivity
and R&D: A Schumpeterian Critique of Semi-endogenous Growth The-
ory"; Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 39, iss. 4, pp. 733-74.
[35] Hall, H. B. (2009), "Business and Financial Method Patents: Innovation
and Policy", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
[36] Howitt, P. (1999), "Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and
R&D Inputs Growing", Journal of Political Economy, vol.107, n. 4,
pp.715-30.
34
[37] Hunt, R. M. (2001), "You Can Patent That? Are Patents on Computer
Programs and Business Methods Good for the New Economy?" Fed. of
Philadelphia Business Review, 1.
[38] Ja¤e, A. B. and Lerner, J. (2006) "Innovation and Its Discontents,"
Capitalism and Society, Vol. 1 : Iss. 3, Article 3, Available at:
http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol1/iss3/art3.
[39] Jones, C. and J. Williams (1998), "Measuring the Social Return to
R&D", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, pp. 1119-1135.
[40] Jones, C. and J. Williams (2000), "Too Much of a Good Thing? The
Economics of Investment in R&D", Journal of Economic Growth, Vol.
5, No. 1, pp. 65-85.
[41] Jones, C., (2005), Growth in a World of Ideas, in Handbook of Eco-
nomic Growth, P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, ed.s, North-Holland, Amster-
dam.
[42] Kiley, M. (1999). "The Supply of Skilled Labour and Skill-Biased Tech-
nological Progress," Economic Journal, vol. 109(458), p. 708-24.
[43] Madsen, J. B., (2008), "Semi-endogenous versus Schumpeterian growth
models: testing the knowledge production function using international
data", Journal of Economic Growth, 3.1, pp. 1-26.
[44] Martins, J. Scarpetta, S. and D. Pilat, (1996),. Markup Pricing, Market
Structure and the Business Cycle, OECD Economic Studies 27, 71-105.
[45] Mueller, J.M. (2001) "No Dilettante A¤air": Rethinking the Experi-
mental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools", 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 22-27.
[46] Mueller, J. M. (2004), "The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption
from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for Uni-
versity and Nonprot Research and Development", Baylor Law Review,
56, p.917.
[47] National Research Council (2003). "Patents in the Knowledge-Based
Economy", edited by W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill, Committee on
Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, National
Research Council, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
35
[48] Niblett, A., R. Posner and A. Shleifer, (2008). "The Evolution of a Legal
Rule," NBER Working Papers 13856.
[49] ODonoghue, T. and Zweimüller, J. (2004),Patents in a Model of En-
dogenous Growth, Journal of Economic Growth, vol.9(1), pp.81-123.
[50] Peretto, P., (1998), "Technological Change and Population Growth",
Journal of Economic Growth, 3, pp. 283-311.
[51] Peretto, P., (1999), "Cost Reduction, Entry, and the Interdependence
of Market Structure and Economic Growth", Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics,v. 43, iss. 1, pp. 173-95.
[52] Roeger, W. (1995). Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Di¤erence
between Primal and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for US
Manufacturing, Journal of Political Economy 103, 2, 316-330;
[53] Romer, P.M. (1990), Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of
Political Economy, vol.98, pp.S71-S102.
[54] Scotchmer, S. (2004), Innovation and Incentives, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Ma.
[55] Sener, F. (2001). "Schumpeterian unemployment, trade and wages,"
Journal of International Economics, vol. 54(1), p. 119-148.
[56] Smulders, S. and van de Klundert, T., (1995) "Imperfect competition,
concentration and growth with rm-specic R&D," European Economic
Review, vol. 39(1), pp. 139-160, January.
[57] Spinesi, L. (2007), "IPR for Public and Private Innovations, and
Growth", Catholic University of, Louvain-la-Neuve, Discussion Paper
2007-15.
[58] Spinesi, L., (2012), "Heterogeneous Academic-Industry Knowledge
Linkage, Heterogeneous IPR, and Growth", Journal of Public Economic
Theory, pp. 67-98.
[59] Young, A. (1998), "Growth without Scale E¤ects", Journal of Political
Economy, 106, 4163.
36
